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The Future Path and Consequences
of the U.S. Earnings/Education Gap
Frank Levy*
ocal labor markets frequently yield natural
experiments—the Mariel Boatlift, for exam-
ple, or the decision of New Jersey to raise its
minimum wage while neighboring states
held constant. In the national labor market, natural experi-
ments are harder to come by as one event is contaminated
by others. The past and future evolution of the earnings/
education gap is a case in point. That gap has evolved con-
currently with two other developments:
• A twenty-year long period of slow wage growth fol-
lowed more recently by a falling growth rate of per
capita income.
• A continuing trend in which higher and lower
income families have become increasingly concen-
trated in separate geographic areas.
When these events are taken together, they pose
the following dilemma:
• Human capital is becoming an increasingly impor-
tant determinant of earnings.
• In the U.S. context of locally run schools, growing
income stratiﬁcation by place makes it harder for poor
and working class children to acquire large amounts
of human capital.
• The natural set of solutions to this problem involves
intervention by higher levels of government.
• But stagnant earnings and living standards make per-
sons increasingly suspicious of higher levels of gov-
ernment.
This dilemma makes the future of the education/earnings
gap a problematic issue.
I will describe the dilemma by ﬁrst reviewing the
context of stagnant wages and living standards. I will then
summarize some of the trends—political and demo-
graphic—that  economic angst has accelerated. Finally, I
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will examine the future path of the education/earnings
gap in the short run, where the die is already cast, and in
the long run, where the factors discussed in this paper
will come into play.
SLOWER GROWTH IN EARNINGS
AND INCOME
For reasons of brevity, the changing rate of return to
education has often been described as “the college/high
school earnings gap.” The term is good verbal short-
hand—reporters love it—but it sometimes encourages
two incorrect impressions. The ﬁrst is that college
graduates and high school graduates are groups of
equal size. They are not. Among men ages 25 to 54, 27
percent have four years of college or more,1 while 48
percent have a high school diploma or less. This means
that the earnings of the “median man” will be closer to
those of a high school graduate than to those of a col-
lege graduate.
The second incorrect impression is that while
high school graduates have done badly, college gradu-
ates have done very well in an absolute sense. Among
men, some have, but many have not. An extreme case—
but not a terribly extreme case—is the college class that
turned 30 in early 1972 just before wage stagnation
began.2 These men were hurt two times. They were hurt
ﬁrst because they spent most of their prime earning
years in a period of slow wage growth. They were hurt
again because they reached their late 40s and early 50s
just in time for the white-collar recession and the dis-
placement of the middle-aged managers who were
“earning their age.”3
Chart 1 traces median earnings for three sub-
groups of the male cohort that turned 30 in 1972: high
school graduates, college graduates (with no additional
schooling), and the “median man” whose earnings rep-
resent the median of all cohort members, regardless of
education.4 The path of median earnings for college
graduates contradicts a second media story—that
everyone is getting poorer. But earnings growth is only
moderate—a total of 17 percent over twenty years,
with very little of that growth in the last decade.
Median earnings growth for the high school graduate is
signiﬁcantly slower, falling slightly over twenty years.
The median man’s earnings grew by a slow 11 percent
over twenty years, with most of that growth in the ﬁrst
ten years.
Most studies of real wage trends (including my
own) focus on the wage structure by looking at, say, the
earnings of 40-year-old men in 1980 and 40-year-old men
in 1990. The comparisons provide information about the
economy and demography but they say little about life as
the individual sees it since they obscure the wage gains
that accrue to experience.5 Chart 1 displays those experi-
ence-based wage gains for men now in their late 40s and
early 50s. Even the men with a bachelor’s degree have not
seen big earnings gains over their careers.
Chart 1 has several caveats but none of them are
serious. First, the data are for men. Women did moderately
better than men over the period.6 Second, the earnings ﬁg-
ures, based on published Census data, exclude taxes. It is
unlikely, however, that after-tax income grew faster than
pretax income over these years.
Third, the earnings ﬁgures exclude the rising pay-
ments for employer-provided health insurance. But to
understand the mood of the country, it makes little sense to
include health care costs as income. If rising income makes
a person happier, it is because the person knows she can
purchase more now than in the past—that is, she can refer
The Earnings Paths of Men Who Were 30 Years Old￿
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back to her own experience to form a judgment. Better
health care means that if a person develops breast cancer
today, she has a better prognosis than someone else who
had a similar breast cancer ﬁfteen years ago. Persons who
are not ill may know all of this in some vague way but
not as well as they know that their insurance costs more.
Persons who are sick may have difﬁculty comparing
themselves to their counterparts ﬁfteen years ago. In
either case, it is unclear that rising health insurance costs
should produce the same happiness as an increase in
money income.7
A ﬁnal caveat is that earnings are not the whole
story—the standard of living as measured by per capita
income is important as well. Per capita income continued
to rise briskly even after the early 1970s because the com-
position of the population was shifting toward earners and
away from dependents. But that shift had demographic
limits and leveled off by the late 1980s. The result is con-
tained in Chart 2, which shows the three-year moving
average of the annual growth rate of per capita income. For
comparison, the chart also includes a three-year moving
average of the annual growth rate of the median income of
35- to 44-year-old men. While the growth of per capita
income remains well above the growth of the earnings sta-
tistic, both growth rates have been falling over time. In
particular, the growth of per capita income has in recent
years averaged less than .5 percent a year.8
POLITICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC
CONSEQUENCES
In a country that counts on mass upward mobility, slow
earnings growth has had obvious consequences. The clear-
est is real disgust with government—particularly the fed-
eral government. The President’s approval rating now
stands at about 38 percent, and the approval rating for
Congress is about half as high. In the current electoral cli-
mate, it is fashionable to blame most of this response on
President Clinton’s policy problems and personality. In
reality, the issues are more long-standing. Consider two
responses to the Washington Post-ABC News Polls in the
fall of 1991, a year before the last election:
Question: When the government in Washington
decides to solve a problem, how much conﬁdence do
you have that the problem will actually be solved?
A lot 7%
Some 31%
Just a little 38%
None at all 23%
Don’t know 1%
Question: Do you think elected leaders in Washing-
ton are really interested in solving the nation’s big-
gest problems, or do you think that they are just
interested in appearing to solve them?
Only want to appear to solve them 65%
Really interested in solving them 29%
Don’t know 1%
So the antipathy toward the federal government has been
there for some time. Attitudes toward lower levels of gov-
ernment, while slightly more positive, are still distrustful.
It is likely that economic insecurity and frustra-
tion play a role in these attitudes. And as the data in the
previous section suggest, economic problems are not lim-
ited to high school graduates. For example, political ana-
lyst Stan Greenberg has done an extensive examination of
the religious right—conservative Protestants who voted in
the 1992 election, attend church at least once a week, and
identify themselves as evangelical, charismatic, or pente-
costal. Greenberg found that the educational attainment of
these voters is not heavily skewed toward high school grad-
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uates but instead closely resembles the educational attain-
ment in the rest of the electorate.9
Turning away from higher level government
means, of necessity, turning toward lower levels of govern-
ment for at least some functions. Here it is important to
note a second trend: the growing sorting of neighborhoods
by income. At one level, this trend is very old—far older
than economic stagnation. It began in earnest at the end of
World War II as mass automobile ownership allowed the
middle class to leave central cities for suburban single-fam-
ily homes. But the trend has continued, stimulated, I
believe, by the increased importance of access to “good
schools” in a child’s future earnings.
As late as 1965, central cities had signiﬁcant num-
bers of middle class families. Today, one-third of all central
city children are poor, and central cities contain 45 percent
of all poor children. And stratiﬁcation goes beyond the
city/suburban split. In a recent working paper, Paul A. Jar-
gowsky (1994) shows that neighborhood sorting by
income has proceeded steadily for all families over the last
twenty years, and has proceeded particularly rapidly over
the last ten years for black and Hispanic families.10
This growing stratiﬁcation by income has obvious
implications for the distribution of educational quality
among the current generation of students. There is, ﬁrst,
the issue of ﬁscal resources for low-income children. Class-
room observers have long been skeptical of claims that
New York City spends as much per student as do wealthy
suburbs. A recent city report resolved the confusion: one-
quarter of the city’s school budget goes to special education
classes for handicapped students, a burden no suburban
school district has. In terms of resources, high-income sub-
urbs, with both richer families and fewer problems, have a
clear advantage.
Equally important are the peer group effects of
increased stratiﬁcation. The problem is clearest in lower
income schools. Outstanding teachers can make any class-
room learn. But as numerous studies document, average
teachers are often overwhelmed by hostile student atti-
tudes, so that classes settle into “treaties” in which teachers
make few demands in exchange for student compliance.
Apprenticeships and other schools-within-schools provide
partial solutions, allowing students who want to learn to
segregate themselves from their peers. But the growing
stratiﬁcation of families by income makes all of these prob-
lems more difﬁcult.
HOW THE EARNINGS/EDUCATION GAP
WILL EVOLVE
Given this background, what is the future path of the col-
lege/high school earnings gap? The question is most use-
fully answered in two parts—the short run, where relevant
variables are already in the pipeline, and the long run,
where answers are of necessity more speculative.
Chart 3 gives a sense of the short term, based on
the college/high school earnings gap for 25- to 34-year-old
men. This is the most dramatic of recent wage move-
ments—the one most often cited in the press. As shown in
the ﬁgure, most of this gap developed between 1980 and
1985. Since 1985, the gap has been relatively stable.
It is reasonable to believe that the gap will remain
fairly stable in the near term. On the supply side, the col-
lapse of high school wages in the early 1980s led to a surge
in the proportion of high school seniors matriculating to
higher education. In the coming years, this outward shift
in supply will come to dominate the 25- to 34-year-old age
bracket and will, ceteris paribus, hold down college wage
rates while it shrinks the current excess supply of high
school graduates. On the demand side, it appears that the
Median Earnings of Men 25 to 34 Years Old,￿
by Education
Chart 3
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recent white-collar recession is more of a onetime adjust-
ment than a long-term trend. Job creation in the current
recovery continues to be concentrated in occupations with
high educational requirements, and it appears that both
international trade and new technologies such as voice rec-
ognition will work against the less skilled. On balance,
then, the near term earnings gap seems unlikely to change
much in either direction.11
In the longer run, however, the prognosis is less
certain for the reasons described in the preceding section. If
large numbers of children are raised in communities with
heavy concentrations of poor and working class families
that cannot or will not improve schooling, there are limits
to what normal supply responses can accomplish.
This problem, of course, is not an act of nature. It
follows from the very decentralized organization of U.S.
schools, in which local jurisdictions are responsible for the
bulk of educational funding and for setting the bulk of
educational standards.12
Solutions to this problem come in two forms. One
form, alluded to earlier, consists of mechanisms that permit
good students in poor districts to segregate themselves.
Vouchers and choice are one way of achieving this result.
Schools-within-school programs are another. But it is rea-
sonable to believe that all of these programs will leave large
numbers of students behind.
A second class of solutions involves intervention
by higher levels of government. Legislators could equalize
state funding or impose more uniform standards, including
the kind of mathematics portfolio assessments being devel-
oped in Vermont or wider use of the New York State
Regents Examinations. But as I argued above, such solu-
tions become less feasible as economic problems create
growing suspicion of government at all levels.
In sum, the college/high school earnings gap indi-
cates that the nation is going through a difﬁcult period, a
period in which trade, technological change, and general
economic turmoil have created frustrated aspirations. The
trick is to keep frustrated aspirations from blocking the
institutions that might help us pass through this period to
something better.40 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JANUARY 1995 NOTES
ENDNOTES
1. This proportion is actually slightly lower for younger men, ages 25 to
34, in the cohort.
2. My friend Robert Samuelson points out that the sudden stagnation of
real wages after 1973 was in part an artifact of President Nixon’s wage
and price controls. Without those controls, which channeled the recovery
into output, stagnation might have begun earlier and proceeded
somewhat more gradually.
3. In published data, the median earnings of 45- to 54-year-old men with
exactly four years of college fell by about 14 percent between 1988 and
1992. The decline was due in part to a growing cohort size in this age
range—the entrance of the baby boom. But much of the decline appears
to reflect the downsizing noted in the text. See Levy (1995) for more
discussion.
4. In order to use published data, I have approximated the average
earnings of 30-year-old men to the published median earnings of men
aged 25 to 34; the earnings of 40-year-old men to the published median
earnings of men aged 35 to 44, and so forth.
5. Put differently, the term “wage stagnation” usually means that a 30-
year-old today earns the same amount as a 30-year-old earned ten years
ago; a 40-year-old today earns the same amount as a 40-year-old earned
ten years ago, and so forth—that is, the wage structure is stagnating.
This stagnation is still compatible with a person’s earning more at 40
than at 30.
6. Interpreting published women’s earnings in a similar framework is
difficult because women’s rates of labor force participation changed
substantially over the period.
7. Likewise, rising incomes among the elderly may fail to produce
political happiness. As with medical care, rising incomes among the
elderly typically involve comparisons among different people—the
elderly today relative to the elderly ten or twenty years ago. Today’s
elderly may have little basis for comparing their situations to the elderly
of twenty years ago and may make a less happy comparison—that their
income is less adequate in retirement than it was in their working years.
8. The weak performance of the earnings statistic partially reflects the
1980s entrance of the baby boomers into this age range. Two other
factors leading to discomfort are the increasing rate of job instability
(David Marcotte 1994) and the increasing rate of earnings instability
(Peter Gottschalk and Robert Moffitt 1994).
9. In unpublished tabulations, Greenberg shows that about 42 percent of
the religious right and 37 percent of the rest of the electorate have not
gone beyond high school. Thirty percent of the religious right and about
34 percent of the rest of the electorate are college graduates.
10. An example is the way in which black middle and working class
families left Washington, D.C., for Prince Georges County, Maryland—
a factor partially responsible for rising poverty rates among the D.C.
population.
11. At the same time, within-group earnings gaps—for example,
earnings gaps among college graduates with different majors—may well
continue to grow.
12. At the level of economic theory, this kind of problem has been
investigated by Roland Benabou (1992) and Steven Durlauf (1992),
among others.REFERENCES
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